Internationalism against Imperialism

In Rus­sia in 1917, impe­ri­al­ism was a tan­gi­ble force in every­day life. To be con­script­ed into the mil­i­tary and sent away, to have one’s grain req­ui­si­tioned for the front, to find one’s work inten­si­fied for the demands of and dis­ci­pline of war man­u­fac­ture – these were the expe­ri­ences of the Great War for those in the pop­u­lar class­es, and it was the polit­i­cal acu­men of the Bol­she­viks to artic­u­late these expe­ri­ences to the prob­lem of impe­ri­al­ism. Indeed, the key polit­i­cal posi­tions adopt­ed by Lenin and the rest of the par­ty through­out 1917 were based, to vary­ing degrees, on their view of the impe­ri­al­ist char­ac­ter of the war and their con­se­quent immov­able oppo­si­tion to it. It was for this rea­son that the Sovi­ets, and not the Pro­vi­sion­al Gov­ern­ment and its par­tic­i­pants, could con­tin­ue to hold legit­i­ma­cy in a sit­u­a­tion of dual pow­er. This account­ed for the Bol­she­vik empha­sis on orga­niz­ing sol­diers, which proved deci­sive time and time again in the July Days, dur­ing the Kornilov Affair, and final­ly in Octo­ber. And it was no coin­ci­dence that already in 1914 Lenin smelled cri­sis, no doubt under­stand­ing the link between the 1905 Russ­ian Rev­o­lu­tion and the Rus­so-Japan­ese War that pre­ced­ed it.

Else­where in Europe, of course, the first World War had already revealed the lim­i­ta­tions of a cer­tain, lit­er­al, kind of inter-nation­al­ism. Where­as com­mu­nist rev­o­lu­tion was under­stood by Marx and Engels to be a world phe­nom­e­non, and the pro­le­tari­at a uni­ver­sal class, the pro­le­tari­at was itself also carved up by nation, mir­ror­ing the his­to­ries that had pro­duced nation­al cap­i­tal­ist class­es in West­ern Europe and sit­u­at­ing their polit­i­cal strate­gies at the lev­el of the nation state. The First and Sec­ond Inter­na­tion­als were ways of coor­di­nat­ing these var­i­ous nation­al pro­le­tar­i­an par­ties, but the ten­sion between a world polit­i­cal project and the self-con­scious­ly nation­al char­ac­ter of its sup­posed sub­ject would per­sist. This led, as José Aricó writes, to:

an ever deep­er breach in the social­ist move­ment between a for­mal inter­na­tion­al­ism and de fac­to every­day nation­al­ism. Thus, the “uni­ver­sal­i­ty” of the pro­le­tari­at was always trans­lat­ed into see­ing, whether con­scious­ly or not, par­tic­u­lar “nation­al” cen­tres wher­ev­er the work­ing mass­es’ rev­o­lu­tion­ary ener­gies were most con­cen­trat­ed as the home of the class’s uni­ver­sal attrib­ut­es: first in Eng­land, then in France, after that in Ger­many and final­ly in Rus­sia.1

Marx him­self would increas­ing­ly ques­tion this way of think­ing the rela­tion between the nation­al and the uni­ver­sal, which car­ried the rem­nants of a Hegelian phi­los­o­phy of his­to­ry, by draw­ing in par­tic­u­lar on analy­ses of Ireland’s colo­nial rela­tion­ship to Eng­land and the impli­ca­tions of this rela­tion­ship for class strug­gle in both places.2 Nev­er­the­less, by 1914 the pre­dom­i­nance of an uncrit­i­cal prac­ti­cal nation­al­ism in the Sec­ond Inter­na­tion­al led to the exten­sive ratio­nal­iz­ing of social-demo­c­ra­t­ic sup­port for impe­ri­al­ist vio­lence, accord­ing to which indi­vid­ual cap­i­tal­ist states, owing to their sup­posed his­tor­i­cal impor­tance, were to be defend­ed in the name of his­tor­i­cal­ly pro­gres­sive class strug­gle: sup­port for the war in Ger­many could be thought as a strug­gle against the reac­tionary force of Tsarism, France’s oppo­si­tion to Ger­many as a “Defense of the Repub­lic!” against the back­ward step of Ger­man feu­dal­ism, etc.

If Rus­sia would even­tu­al­ly be thought as the indi­vid­ual case demon­strat­ing the uni­ver­sal pos­si­bil­i­ty of pro­le­tar­i­an rev­o­lu­tion, this was by no means so before or dur­ing 1917. Iron­i­cal­ly, the fact that even Russ­ian rev­o­lu­tion­ar­ies under­stood their coun­try to be “back­ward” may have pre­vent­ed them from the mis­take of myopi­cal­ly see­ing their poten­tial rev­o­lu­tion­ary vic­to­ry as the ful­fill­ment of an epochal world-his­tor­i­cal neces­si­ty that would by itself eman­ci­pate all human­i­ty. On the con­trary, a non-invest­ment in nation­al­i­ty was the basis for Lenin’s abil­i­ty to devel­op a strate­gic con­cep­tion of impe­ri­al­ism in which the pro­le­tari­at had no rea­son to take sides among com­pet­ing pow­ers. Lenin the­o­rized impe­ri­al­ism as a con­flict stem­ming from the con­cen­tra­tion and cen­tral­iza­tion of cap­i­tal in which states had become so behold­en to their nation­al monop­oly cap­i­tal­ists that they would wage war direct­ly as part of the strug­gle for new mar­kets, resources, and sites for cap­i­tal export. Thus, the Great War pre­sent­ed an oppor­tu­ni­ty: intra­cap­i­tal­ist con­flict would cre­ate the kinds of crises that would allow pro­le­tar­i­an par­ties to turn “impe­ri­al­ist war into civ­il war.” In oth­er words, impe­ri­al­ism had to be under­stood by its effects on the ter­rain of var­i­ous nation­al class strug­gles and the inten­si­fi­ca­tion of those strug­gles in all nations; the work­ing class­es would do bet­ter to cheer on the defeat of their own rul­ing class­es than to sup­port a war that could only be for cap­i­tal, with work­ers and peas­ants as grist for the bloody mill. Indeed, even after the suc­cess of the Feb­ru­ary Rev­o­lu­tion, and to the indis­pens­able polit­i­cal ben­e­fit of the Bol­she­viks, Lenin would hold this line, argu­ing that, “The slight­est con­ces­sion to rev­o­lu­tion­ary defen­cism is a betray­al of social­ism, a com­plete renun­ci­a­tion of inter­na­tion­al­ism, no mat­ter by what fine phras­es and ‘prac­ti­cal’ con­sid­er­a­tions it may be jus­ti­fied.”3

It was dur­ing the Great War, then, that two ten­den­cies of inter­na­tion­al­ism, as dis­tinct respons­es to the impe­ri­al­ist char­ac­ter of cap­i­tal­ism, would clar­i­fy them­selves with­in the work­ers’ move­ment: first, the inter-nation­al­ism whose nation­al­ist under­pin­nings had para­dox­i­cal­ly cre­at­ed com­plic­i­ty with the impe­ri­al­ist war, and sec­ond, what Michael Hardt and Toni Negri call an “anti­na­tion­al­ist” inter­na­tion­al­ism, accord­ing to which

inter­na­tion­al­ism was the will of an active mass sub­ject that rec­og­nized that the nation-states were key agents of cap­i­tal­ist exploita­tion and that the mul­ti­tude was con­tin­u­al­ly draft­ed to fight their sense­less wars – in short, that the nation-state was a polit­i­cal form whose con­tra­dic­tions could not be sub­sumed and sub­li­mat­ed but only destroyed. Inter­na­tion­al sol­i­dar­i­ty was real­ly a project for the destruc­tion of the nation-state and the con­struc­tion of a new glob­al com­mu­ni­ty.4

In this lat­ter view, an inter­na­tion­al­ism opposed to impe­ri­al­ism should go beyond mir­ror­ing its form as a chain of nations; such was the view of Lenin, sit­u­at­ed pre­cise­ly at the latter’s weak link, where the con­tra­dic­to­ry phe­nom­e­na of class strug­gle, polit­i­cal cri­sis, and inter­na­tion­al strife would con­dense into one of the 20th century’s first pro­le­tar­i­an rev­o­lu­tion­ary rup­tures. By rec­og­niz­ing impe­ri­al­ism as a phe­nom­e­non dis­tinct but insep­a­ra­ble from cap­i­tal­ism tout court, the Bol­she­viks could take into account its real effects on the rela­tion of class forces in the con­junc­ture, and devel­op an anti-war polit­i­cal posi­tion that few oth­ers were will­ing to take.

The mal­leable rela­tion­ship between these two con­cep­tions of inter­na­tion­al­ism and the ques­tion of impe­ri­al­ism would come into play repeat­ed­ly through­out the rest of the cen­tu­ry. But curi­ous­ly, the effect of this inter­ven­ing time that has giv­en us our present has been to ren­der the con­cepts of impe­ri­al­ism and inter­na­tion­al­ism opaque. This is not to say that impe­ri­al­ism itself is absent for the work­ers of the world; those fac­ing drone strikes or mil­i­tary occu­pa­tion dai­ly, those crushed under the weight of their gov­ern­ments’ sov­er­eign debts or for­eign sanc­tions, the sol­diers con­tin­u­al­ly drawn into its wars, and those who risk life to cross or be detained at bor­ders, among many oth­ers, all cer­tain­ly live the exis­tence of impe­ri­al­ism. But to actu­al­ly re-con­cep­tu­al­ize the speci­fici­ty of this exis­tence, and to fur­ther­more pose a strate­gic and inter­na­tion­al­ist response, would mean to think togeth­er about what is at work in all of these expe­ri­ences. If impe­ri­al­ism today is irre­ducible to any sin­gle phe­nom­e­non (even a mas­sive phe­nom­e­non on the scale of a World War), then this is because it appears at once both ubiq­ui­tous and dis­persed. How then to account today for the his­to­ry that has ampli­fied impe­ri­al­ism while mak­ing it all the more dif­fi­cult to define?

The post-Cold War peri­od has cer­tain­ly pro­duced a num­ber of attempts to ana­lyt­i­cal­ly dis­cern and cen­ter new modes of polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic sub­jec­tion, even among the frag­men­ta­tion of old­er con­fig­u­ra­tions of sov­er­eign­ty and social pow­er. A clus­ter of his­tor­i­cal stud­ies, some more ambi­tious than oth­ers, have indi­cat­ed that impe­ri­al­ism is alive and well, even if these stud­ies dif­fer in try­ing to clar­i­fy its pre­cise char­ac­ter, caus­es, and effects.5 For our present pur­pos­es, we can parse a few stum­bling blocks for under­stand­ing both the place of impe­ri­al­ism in an account of the present, and the prospects for any kind of anti-impe­ri­al­ist per­spec­tive in com­mu­nist prac­tice.

First, as sig­naled above, is the con­tin­u­ing rel­e­vance of the nation-state under “post­colo­nial cap­i­tal­ism” or “cap­i­tal­ist glob­al­iza­tion,” albeit recom­posed in mul­ti­far­i­ous ways.6 The uneven geo­gra­phies, lay­ered tem­po­ral­i­ties, and mul­ti­ple labor regimes which mark con­tem­po­rary cap­i­tal­ist accu­mu­la­tion and mon­e­ti­za­tion today cer­tain­ly have trans­formed the inter­na­tion­al order; but the role and scope of many a state has been rein­scribed and syn­chro­nized to fit the tem­po and require­ments of cap­i­tal­ist pro­duc­tion and repro­duc­tion. The tran­si­tion from anti-colo­nial or indige­nous move­ments to state-build­ing process­es and, amidst glob­al counter-rev­o­lu­tion, world mar­ket inte­gra­tion in much of Africa, Asia, and Latin Amer­i­ca has demon­strat­ed the dif­fi­cul­ties of pre­vi­ous con­stel­la­tions of anti-impe­ri­al­ism and their reliance on the nation-form.7 Of course, many of these move­ments pro­vid­ed essen­tial insights into the pol­i­tics of anti-impe­ri­al­ism, and most con­tained ele­ments which sought nation­al lib­er­a­tion only as a con­junc­tur­al step­ping stone to inter­na­tion­al com­mu­nist rev­o­lu­tion. Yet as many post­colo­nial or devel­op­ing states have been incor­po­rat­ed – not with­out sig­nif­i­cant con­flicts, crises, and vio­lence – into the eco­nom­ic agree­ments and polit­i­cal for­ma­tions of the cap­i­tal­ist bloc, rad­i­cal imag­i­nar­ies of South-South coop­er­a­tion have dimmed.8 Of course, such incor­po­ra­tion is more var­ie­gat­ed than the “flat world” of Fried­man­ite delu­sion. The array of U.S. tar­get­ing tech­nolo­gies – sanc­tions against Iran and Zim­bab­we, embar­go on Cuba, ter­ror lists for groups in the Philip­pines, Turkey, Lebanon, and Pales­tine, as well as out­right aggres­sion – invites us to exam­ine how the speci­fici­ties of forms of cap­i­tal­ist rule can be tracked through the frac­tured his­to­ry of mod­ern impe­ri­al­ism and colo­nial­ism.

The chal­lenge of reac­ti­vat­ing an effec­tive pro­le­tar­i­an inter­na­tion­al­ism is made even more urgent by the aggres­sive rise of right-wing nation­alisms, which have tak­en a range of orga­ni­za­tion­al and ide­o­log­i­cal guis­es. The clar­i­fied ide­o­log­i­cal form of this right­ward shift is an embold­ened “pos­ses­sive nation­al­ism” in the North, which revolves around restric­tive immi­gra­tion and trade poli­cies, as respons­es to the per­ceived ero­sion of ter­ri­to­r­i­al log­ics of sov­er­eign­ty, and the hybridiza­tion of the eth­no-nation­al com­mu­ni­ty.9 Any pro­longed com­bat against these nativist impuls­es – espe­cial­ly as they seep into social-demo­c­ra­t­ic or left-lib­er­al par­ties in Europe and the Unit­ed States – will need to rein­force the link between migra­tion and impe­ri­al­ism, the for­mer in many ways con­sti­tut­ing the reflux of the lat­ter. Here we might cen­ter the rich lega­cy and actu­al­i­ty of migrant struggles for com­mu­nist pol­i­tics, and how ques­tions of mobil­i­ty, con­trol, and dis­pos­ses­sion are now at the core of impe­ri­al­ist dynam­ics. The polit­i­cal and social, infor­mal and for­mal spaces of migra­tion remain an open field for inves­ti­ga­tion. As Eti­enne Bal­ibar not­ed over 40 years ago, “the con­crete knowl­edge of the caus­es and effects of immi­gra­tion is a two-way guid­ing thread towards an under­stand­ing of impe­ri­al­ism,” a fact which “ren­ders inter­na­tion­al­ism, more than ever, the very con­di­tion of strug­gles for work­ers’ lib­er­a­tion.”10 This rais­es the prac­ti­cal neces­si­ty of recon­sid­er­ing the tac­ti­cal reper­toire and strate­gic hori­zons of anti-impe­ri­al­ism. The near­ly two-decades-long “War on Ter­ror” – a euphemism for a war on human wel­fare in the Mid­dle East and a war against Mus­lims at home – has proven to be a dif­fi­cult nub for anti-war and anti-mil­i­tarist activism in “the bel­ly of the beast,” par­tic­u­lar­ly as U.S. vio­lence, amidst ever-shal­low­er domes­tic hege­mo­ny, takes forms oth­er than that of U.S. boots on the ground. The fad­ing – or destruc­tion – of the anti-war move­ment after 2005, fol­low­ing mas­sive demon­stra­tions against the inva­sion of Iraq which fea­tured con­sid­er­able grass­roots mobi­liza­tion, is a crit­i­cal episode to reflect upon. The ubiq­ui­ty of manned and unmanned aer­i­al bom­bard­ment, the dif­fuse and often cloaked nature of coun­terin­sur­gency oper­a­tions, the mul­ti­pli­ca­tion of U.S. prox­ies, and dense finan­cial ties have ren­dered the mil­i­tary con­flicts of U.S. empire, per­haps the most vis­i­ble man­i­fes­ta­tion of impe­ri­al­ism, an asym­met­ri­cal yet con­stant pres­ence. Any sus­tained fight against it must be coor­di­nat­ed around sev­er­al fronts. Recent expe­ri­ences of mass protest show that a pow­er­ful anti-war move­ment, if it is to reap­pear, would do so in an altered shape and in close rela­tion to oth­er insur­gent forces in soci­ety, an exten­sion of their dis­cur­sive and strate­gic reach. The high lev­el of orga­nized resis­tance to mil­i­ta­rized bor­der secu­ri­ty and repres­sive immi­gra­tion poli­cies, the envi­ron­men­tal­ist/an­ti-extrac­tivist cam­paigns around Stand­ing Rock and else­where, and the nascent coali­tions and activist milieus that have been for­ti­fied through the Inter­na­tion­al Women’s Strike ini­tia­tives (res­o­nant with calls from Latin Amer­i­ca for a new fem­i­nist inter­na­tion­al) indi­cate a real poten­tial to build a “pop­u­lar anti-impe­ri­al­ism” from ground­ed social strug­gles, con­nect­ing the sites of con­tes­ta­tion across neo-colo­nial and impe­r­i­al fron­tiers. One can see how this changes the aims and tar­gets of alter-glob­al­iza­tion move­ments, exem­pli­fied in the mil­i­tan­cy of sum­mit-hop­ping demos that direct­ly con­front lead­ing eco­nom­ic and finan­cial bod­ies, or in the par­al­lel insti­tu­tion-build­ing and transna­tion­al net­work­ing of civ­il soci­ety orga­ni­za­tions involved in the World Social Forums.11 A more ade­quate approach to ques­tions of coor­di­na­tion and sol­i­dar­i­ty across bor­ders would have to probe how polit­i­cal orga­ni­za­tion is tied to mate­r­i­al prac­tices of trans­la­tion, and rec­og­nize that even local­ized con­cerns often involve the com­mon­al­i­ties and divi­sions of the glob­al labor force.12 The muta­tions of class strug­gle, where the wage-earn­ing pro­le­tari­at has giv­en way to more diverse social alliances and asso­ci­a­tions of what Goran Ther­born calls the “ple­beian stra­ta” or “pop­u­lar class­es,” has pro­vid­ed glimpses of what anti-impe­ri­al­ist mobi­liza­tion could look like: new strate­gies of thread­ing upsurges of dis­rup­tion, com­bi­na­tion, and antag­o­nism as they extend over an unsta­ble ter­rain.13

Today, it is nec­es­sary to re-sit­u­ate the con­cept and ques­tion of impe­ri­al­ism. We agree with Lenin when we rec­og­nize that no rev­o­lu­tion, even a nation­al one, is pos­si­ble with­out grasp­ing the effects of impe­ri­al­ism on any local artic­u­la­tion of the work­ing class. And we fur­ther agree that, of course, no nation­al rev­o­lu­tion would be suf­fi­cient for the goal of com­mu­nism. In short, we see impe­ri­al­ism as both an obsta­cle to and ene­my of inter­na­tion­al­ism and we in turn view inter­na­tion­al­ism as a posi­tion to be com­posed in work­ing class strug­gle itself. Thus, at the risk of sim­pli­fy­ing our approach, we pro­pose that to exam­ine impe­ri­al­ism today is to bring it into the realm of class com­po­si­tion. This can involve no dis­avow­al of the com­pli­cat­ed his­to­ry of Marx­ism and pop­u­lar strug­gle with regard to impe­ri­al­ism, nor a sim­ple rep­e­ti­tion of any one of its moments. In our sixth issue of View­point, we instead seek out the pos­si­bil­i­ty of an encounter, bring­ing togeth­er his­tor­i­cal accounts, arte­facts of strug­gle, and the­o­ret­i­cal inter­ven­tions past and present. Thus we nei­ther “endorse” all of the posi­tions rep­re­sent­ed here nor reject those that might be absent from this issue, which is a sit­u­at­ed engage­ment with the prob­lem of oppos­ing impe­ri­al­ism from with­in Amer­i­can empire; we are proud to offer these con­tri­bu­tions as mate­r­i­al for the long-term work of think­ing and strug­gling against impe­ri­al­ism in the 21st cen­tu­ry.

We will not over­state the sys­tem­atic­i­ty of this approach; pro­ceed­ing in this way entails a roll of the dice. It may involve tak­ing up a his­to­ry and putting it down again, only to have its impor­tance sud­den­ly strike us when we’ve moved onto a seem­ing­ly unre­lat­ed study, or when we lat­er dis­cuss a press­ing issue at a polit­i­cal meet­ing. The cat­e­gories we present here could be pre­sent­ed oth­er­wise, and the var­i­ous themes and top­ics that have entered into the cur­rent issue are cer­tain­ly not enough to fill the lacu­na of the con­cept of impe­ri­al­ism demand­ed by our present. Under- or unrep­re­sent­ed are migra­tion and the strug­gles that sur­round it; eco­log­i­cal impe­ri­al­ism and cli­mate debt; the role of Chi­na and oth­er states of grow­ing eco­nom­ic weight and polit­i­cal sig­nif­i­cance; con­fig­u­ra­tions of “super-exploita­tion,” unequal exchange, and neolib­er­al labor arbi­trage; the chang­ing nature of war – con­ven­tion­al, nuclear, and oth­er­wise; U.S. and E.U. sanc­tions as a tool of war­craft and state­craft; the role of pri­ma­ry extrac­tion and oth­er envi­ron­men­tal threats; the ongo­ing pres­ence and effects of set­tler colo­nial­ism; and cer­tain­ly much more. As always, we hope this issue of View­point is only the begin­ning. If these works can be a foun­da­tion for more the­o­ret­i­cal and polit­i­cal work, we will be pleased. And if oth­ers are com­pelled to fill in what we and our con­trib­u­tors have had to put aside, even these lacks will have had a pur­pose.


  1. José Aricó, Marx and Latin Amer­i­ca, trans. David Broder (Chica­go: Hay­mar­ket, 2014). 

  2. Kol­ja Lind­ner, “Marx’s Euro­cen­trism: Post­colo­nial stud­ies and Marx schol­ar­ship,” Rad­i­cal Phi­los­o­phy 161 (May–June 2010). 

  3. V.I. Lenin, The Tasks of the Pro­le­tari­at in Our Rev­o­lu­tion, 1917. 

  4. Michael Hardt and Anto­nio Negri, Empire (Cam­bridge, MA: Har­vard Uni­ver­si­ty Press, 2000), 49. 

  5. David Har­vey, Ellen Meiksins Wood, Robert Bren­ner, and, most recent­ly, John Mil­ios and Dim­itris P. Sotiropou­los come to mind here; also see John Smith’s recent work, the ongo­ing con­tri­bu­tions from Utsa and Prab­hat Pant­naik, inter­ven­tions by Samir Amin, and oth­er efforts clus­tered around Month­ly Review. One can also con­sult the essays by Salar Mohan­desi and Jerome Roos in this issue. 

  6. See Leo Pan­itch and Sam Gindin, The Mak­ing of Glob­al Cap­i­tal­ism: The Polit­i­cal Econ­o­my of U.S. Empire (Lon­don: Ver­so, 2013). 

  7. See Eti­enne Bal­ibar, “The Nation Form: His­to­ry and Ide­ol­o­gy,” trans. Chris Turn­er, in Immanuel Waller­stein and Eti­enne Bal­ibar, Race, Nation, Class (Lon­don: Ver­so, 1991). 

  8. See Vijay Prashad, The Poor­er Nations: A Pos­si­ble His­to­ry of the Glob­al South (New York: Ver­so, 2012). 

  9. See Bren­na Bhandar’s arti­cle in the present issue. 

  10. See Eti­enne Bal­ibar, “Lénine, les com­mu­nistes, l’immigration,” in Cinq études sur matéri­al­isme his­torique (Paris: Maspéro, 1974), 195–201. A trans­la­tion of this text will be forth­com­ing in View­point. 

  11. Donatel­la Del­la Por­ta, Glob­al­iza­tion from Below: Transna­tion­al Activists and Protest Net­works (Min­neapo­lis: Uni­ver­si­ty of Min­neso­ta Press, 2006); Research Unit for Polit­i­cal Econ­o­my, Mum­bai, “The Eco­nom­ics and Pol­i­tics of the World Social Forum,” Aspects of India’s Econ­o­my 35 (Sep­tem­ber 2003). 

  12. See San­dro Mez­zadra and Brett Neil­son, Bor­der as Method (Durham: Duke Uni­ver­si­ty Press, 2013); Kel­ly Mul­vaney, “Trans­lat­ing Con­stituent Process, or the Polit­i­cal Work of Trans­la­tion,” Eipcp trans­ver­sal, Sep­tem­ber 2016. 

  13. Goran Ther­born, “Class in the 21st Cen­tu­ry,” New Left Review II, no. 78 (November–December 2012): 5–29. See also Michael Den­ning, Rep­re­sent­ing Glob­al Labor,” Social Text 25, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 125–45; San­dro Mez­zadra and Veróni­ca Gago, “In the Wake of the Ple­beian Revolt: Social Move­ments, ‘Pro­gres­sive’ Gov­ern­ments, and the Pol­i­tics of Auton­o­my in Latin Amer­i­ca,” Anthro­po­log­i­cal The­o­ry 17, no. 4 (2017): 474–496. 

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