The End of Progressive Hegemony and the Regressive Turn in Latin America: The End of a Cycle?

We offer the fol­low­ing trans­la­tion in the wake of the leg­isla­tive elec­tions in Venezuela on Decem­ber 6, 2015 which saw the right-wing Mesa de la Unidad Democráti­ca (Demo­c­ra­t­ic Uni­ty Round­table, MUD) deci­sive­ly seize con­trol of the Nation­al Assem­bly from the Par­tido Social­ista Unido de Venezuela (Unit­ed Social­ist Par­ty of Venezuela, PSUV), and the recent elec­tion to the Argen­tine pres­i­den­cy of con­ser­v­a­tive can­di­date Mauri­cio Macri, for­mer­ly the neolib­er­al may­or of Buenos Aires, who defeat­ed the Kirch­ner­ist can­di­date Daniel Sci­oli, a fig­ure him­self on the Right of Per­o­nism. The present essay by Mas­si­mo Mod­one­si was writ­ten pri­or to those events, but it grap­ples with a ques­tion that has only become more press­ing in their after­math: Whith­er Latin Amer­i­ca?


The expe­ri­ence of the so-called pro­gres­sive gov­ern­ments in Latin Amer­i­ca (Argenti­na, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Sal­vador, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela) seem two have entered a crit­i­cal phase which some authors have called the end of a cycle, open­ing up a debate on the char­ac­ter of the region­al con­junc­ture with impor­tant strate­gic impli­ca­tions for the imme­di­ate future.1 I will defend, in a syn­thet­ic way, the idea that, in a strict sense, the cycle has not end­ed, nor is it near­ing its end in the short term, under­stand­ing by cycle the peri­od of the exer­cise of gov­ern­ment of pro­gres­sive forces; at the same time, how­ev­er, we can and must iden­ti­fy and ana­lyze the close of the hege­mon­ic phase of this cycle, with the con­se­quences that this implies for the medi­um term.

To do this we begin with the char­ac­ter­i­za­tion of the pro­gres­sive Latin Amer­i­can cycle as a total­i­ty of dif­fer­ent ver­sions of pas­sive rev­o­lu­tion – that is, fol­low­ing the intu­ition of Gram­sci, a series of process­es of sig­nif­i­cant but lim­it­ed struc­tur­al trans­for­ma­tions, with a con­ser­v­a­tive under­tone, pushed for­ward from above and through demo­bi­liz­ing and sub­or­di­nat­ing polit­i­cal prac­tices.2 These are expressed prin­ci­pal­ly through the devices of cae­sarism and trans­formism as modal­i­ties of emp­ty­ing out, from top to bot­tom, chan­nels of pop­u­lar orga­ni­za­tion, par­tic­i­pa­tion and pro­tag­o­nism.3 Pas­sive rev­o­lu­tion is a for­mu­la that seeks and achieves a hege­mon­ic exit to a sit­u­a­tion of an equi­lib­ri­um of forces, or a “cat­a­stroph­ic equi­lib­ri­um” – a for­mu­la reflect­ed in the expe­ri­ence of Latin Amer­i­can pro­gres­sivism in the decade of the 2000s. We can ana­lyze the cur­rent moment through this lens in order to prob­lema­tize and deep­en our under­stand­ing of the hypoth­e­sis of the end of the cycle, by high­light­ing a cen­tral and deter­min­ing fea­ture of the con­junc­ture: the rel­a­tive loss of hege­mo­ny, which is to say the grow­ing inca­pac­i­ty to build and sus­tain a broad cross-class con­sen­sus, and strong pop­u­lar roots, both of which char­ac­ter­ized the ear­li­er stage of con­sol­i­da­tion of these gov­ern­ments.

In effect, the phase of hege­mon­ic con­sol­i­da­tion, which was repeat­ed­ly expressed in the results of elec­tions and plebiscites, appears to have end­ed. That phase was forged fun­da­men­tal­ly through the effec­tive exer­cise of a series of state- and par­ty- medi­a­tions, dis­plac­ing the right from strate­gic insti­tu­tion­al lymph nodes and ide­o­log­i­cal appa­ra­tus­es of the state, and installing in their place a series of idea-forces, slo­gans, and polit­i­cal val­ues of a nation­al-pop­u­lar char­ac­ter, such as sov­er­eign­ty, nation­al­ism, progress, devel­op­ment, social jus­tice, redis­tri­b­u­tion, and ple­beian dig­ni­ty, among oth­ers. In some coun­tries, this phase was accom­pa­nied by a direct con­fronta­tion with attempts at con­ser­v­a­tive restora­tion, either through coup attempts or oth­er extra-insti­tu­tion­al forms – as in the cas­es of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, but also in Argenti­na dur­ing the recent agrar­i­an con­flict. The out­comes of these attempts left the right-wing of these coun­tries deeply weak­ened and, as a con­se­quence, opened up a path toward a more pro­found and far-reach­ing hege­mon­ic prac­tice of the pro­gres­sive gov­ern­ments, includ­ing the refor­mu­la­tion of con­sti­tu­tion­al frame­works and in so doing the gen­er­a­tion of the sce­nario for the so-called “epoch of change.”4

This phase seems to have defin­i­tive­ly end­ed. At least since 2013, a point of inflec­tion is per­cep­ti­ble, with cer­tain tem­po­ral and for­mal vari­a­tions across dif­fer­ent coun­tries, a shift from a more pro­gres­sive pro­file to one ten­den­tial­ly more regres­sive.5 This turn is par­tic­u­lar­ly evi­dent in the most recent peri­od in the bud­getary respons­es to the eco­nom­ic cri­sis that is plagu­ing the region, which priv­i­lege cap­i­tal at the cost of labor and the envi­ron­ment. It is also evi­dent in the atti­tude assumed by these gov­ern­ments in rela­tion to social move­ments sit­u­at­ed to their left. The regres­sive turn has tend­ed to hard­en dis­cur­sive­ly and mate­ri­al­ly with time, as in the case of repres­sive mea­sures adopt­ed against recent mobi­liza­tions in Ecuador.

Gram­sci main­tained that one can and must dis­tin­guish between pro­gres­sive and regres­sive cae­sarisms. I would add that this antin­o­my is also an inter­pre­tive key which can be applied to the analy­sis of diverse forms and dis­tinct phas­es of pas­sive rev­o­lu­tions, since it allows us to rec­og­nize diverse com­bi­na­tions and pro­gres­sive and regres­sive fea­tures, and the pre­dom­i­nance of either one of these in suc­ces­sive moments of the his­tor­i­cal process.6

From the begin­ning, diverse ten­den­cies have coex­ist­ed inside of the blocs and social and polit­i­cal alliances that have sup­port­ed pro­gres­sive Latin Amer­i­can gov­ern­ments. If in the ini­tial phase the pro­gres­sive fea­tures dom­i­nat­ed, con­tribut­ing to their denom­i­na­tion as pro­gres­sive, one can iden­ti­fy a lat­er ten­den­tial con­ser­v­a­tive turn which oper­ates in a regres­sive sense with respect to the ear­li­er pro­gres­sive fea­tures of the hege­mon­ic phase in the exer­cise of pow­er by the pro­gres­sive gov­ern­ments. This change in direc­tion man­i­fests itself organ­i­cal­ly in the heart of the blocs and alliances which sus­tain these gov­ern­ments, and express­es itself fur­ther in the ori­en­ta­tion of pub­lic poli­cies, jus­ti­fy­ing itself, from the optic of the defense of posi­tions of pow­er, due to the neces­si­ty to com­pen­sate for the loss of trans­ver­sal hege­mo­ny through a move­ment toward the Cen­tre.

This cen­trism, inci­den­tal­ly, would seem to con­trast with the log­ic of Left-Right and peo­ple-oli­garchy polar­iza­tions which char­ac­ter­ized the emer­gence of these gov­ern­ments, sup­port­ed by the erup­tion of strong anti-neolib­er­al move­ments and the lat­er con­fronta­tions with the con­ser­v­a­tive restora­tion attempts by the Right that opened up doors for hege­mon­ic con­sol­i­da­tion. At the same time, if we fol­low the hypoth­e­sis of Maris­tel­la Svam­pa of a return of pop­ulist devices, a real, organ­ic and polit­i­cal move­ment toward the Cen­tre does not exclude the use of con­fronta­tion­al rhetoric, typ­i­cal of the pop­ulist for­mat; although, ten­den­tial­ly, this would have to, and prob­a­bly will, be mod­er­at­ed in the inter­ests of greater coher­ence between form and con­tent.7

In any case, we are wit­ness­ing a fun­da­men­tal, his­tor­i­cal, and struc­tur­al turn in the polit­i­cal com­po­si­tion of these gov­ern­ments, and, there­fore, of a sig­nif­i­cant peri­od in the polit­i­cal his­to­ry of con­tem­po­rary Latin Amer­i­ca.

The slide towards a regres­sive pro­file is more notice­able in some coun­tries (Argenti­na, Brazil, and Ecuador) than in oth­ers (Venezuela, Bolivia, and Uruguay), since in the lat­ter cas­es the social and polit­i­cal blocs of pro­gres­sive pow­er has remained rel­a­tive­ly intact; strong cleav­ages have not opened up to the Left, and the Right remains rel­a­tive­ly weak (except in the uncer­tain Venezue­lan sce­nario where this assess­ment is debat­able). Although the mol­e­c­u­lar dis­place­ments at the lev­el of social and polit­i­cal alliances, the influ­ences of class­es and class frac­tions and social and polit­i­cal groups, and their coun­ter­part in the reori­en­ta­tion of pub­lic pol­i­cy, are the foun­da­tion­al phe­nom­e­na of the peri­od, we will men­tion here, as an exam­ple – for rea­sons of space and because of the objec­tive dif­fi­cul­ty in real­iz­ing such a com­pli­cat­ed analy­sis in all of these areas at the scale of Latin Amer­i­ca – only some of the most vis­i­ble reflec­tions in the sphere of polit­i­cal par­ties and lead­er­ships.

In Argenti­na, the con­ser­v­a­tive turn is quite evi­dent in the can­di­da­cy of Daniel Sci­oli in the Frente para la Vic­to­ria (Front for Vic­to­ry, FpV), some­one who is not, to use an Argen­tine expres­sion, a Kirch­ner­ist in his kid­neys (del riñon kirch­ner­ista), in con­trast with the Vice pres­i­den­tial can­di­date Car­los Zan­ni­ni, who had sanc­tioned an adjust­ment of the Per­o­nist “minia­ture polit­i­cal sys­tem” (using an expres­sion of his­to­ri­an Juan Car­los Torre) toward the Cen­tre-Right which was set in motion in the final years of the grad­ual weak­en­ing of Kirch­ner­ism.8

In Brazil, it has been some time since var­i­ous authors began to sig­nal a genet­ic muta­tion, aside from the scan­dals of cor­rup­tion, in the inte­ri­or of the Work­ers Par­ty (PT). The soci­ol­o­gist Fran­cis­co “Chico” de Oliveira iden­ti­fied it in the emer­gence of the orn­i­tor­rin­co, a hybrid fig­ure, part trade union­ist, part finan­cial spec­u­la­tor, installed in the man­age­ment of immense pen­sion funds which nav­i­gate the finan­cial mar­kets.9 In this sense, the pos­si­ble return of Lula would not sub­stan­tial­ly mod­i­fy the polit­i­cal ori­en­ta­tion assumed by Dil­ma, in the same way that no change of ori­en­ta­tion occurred when she replaced him; the turn toward the Cen­tre has man­i­fest­ed itself in the con­junc­ture above all through the diminu­tion of social spend­ing in com­par­i­son to the per­sis­tent direct and indi­rect sup­port to the process of cap­i­tal accu­mu­la­tion.

The same ten­den­cy has appeared in the Ecuado­ri­an case since the dis­place­ment of sec­tors of the Left inter­nal to the Alian­za País (Coun­try Alliance, AP) par­ty and the selec­tion of Jorge Glas, clear­ly iden­ti­fied with the pri­vate sec­tor, as the vice pres­i­den­tial can­di­date to run along­side Cor­rea in the 2013 elec­tions.10

In Uruguay, the regres­sion is evi­dent at the ide­o­log­i­cal lev­el in the change of lead­er­ship from Pepe Muji­ca to Tabaré Vázquez, who reflects the inter­nal and exter­nal equi­lib­ri­ums of the Frente Amplia (Broad Front, FA), which are mov­ing toward the Right, although with a cer­tain con­ti­nu­ity of a sta­ble polit­i­cal force and a defined project. At the same time, this move­ment has only very recent­ly begun to reflect on events and con­crete sit­u­a­tions that seem to point in the direc­tion of a loss of hege­mo­ny and the awak­en­ing of social and polit­i­cal oppo­si­tions.11

In rela­tion to the Andean cas­es – Bolivia and Ecuador – Maris­tel­la Svam­pa points out a rup­ture with pre­vi­ous com­mit­ments which could sanc­tion “the loss of the eman­ci­pa­to­ry dimen­sion of pol­i­tics and the evo­lu­tion toward mod­els of dom­i­na­tion of a tra­di­tion­al kind, based in the cult of lead­er­ship and iden­ti­fi­ca­tion with the state.”12

In the case of Bolivia, in spite of the emer­gence of an “Aymara bour­geoisie” and the bureau­cra­ti­za­tion and insti­tu­tion­al­iza­tion of broad sec­tors of the lead­er­ships of the social move­ments that led the anti-neolib­er­al strug­gles, the shift toward the Cen­tre is less vis­i­ble in terms of the polit­i­cal com­po­si­tion of the pow­er bloc. At the same time, the theme of the re-elec­tion of Evo and a pos­si­ble ref­er­en­dum on this, opens up a del­i­cate sce­nario, in spite of the fact that sol­id elec­toral alter­na­tives from the Right have not been con­sol­i­dat­ed. The Right, apart from some local results, still has not reared its head, and the Movimien­to Sin Miedo (Move­ment With­out Fear, MSM) has not been able to expand on its sol­id root­ed­ness in the cap­i­tal city of La Paz (the MSM achieved less than 3% in the 2014 nation­al elec­tions).13

These regres­sive ten­den­cies are still less evi­dent in Venezuela, the only coun­try where the gen­er­al­ized par­tic­i­pa­tion of the sub­al­tern class­es has been pushed for­ward through the con­fig­u­ra­tion of the com­munes since 2009, in spite of the fact that this decen­tral­iz­ing devel­op­ment was bal­anced with the almost simul­ta­ne­ous cre­ation of the Par­tido Social­ista Unifi­ca­do de Venezuela (Unit­ed Social­ist Par­ty of Venezuela, PSUV), as an organ of cen­tral­iza­tion, and as the polit­i­cal arm of Chav­is­mo. On the oth­er hand, the exac­er­bat­ed polar­iza­tion by the Right has tend­ed to com­press the pop­u­lar camp behind lead­er­ship groups of the Boli­var­i­an Rev­o­lu­tion, in spite of par­tic­u­lar­ly frag­ile eco­nom­ic cir­cum­stances that do not allow a deep­en­ing of the process, gen­er­ate inter­nal ten­sions, and even­tu­al­ly could strength­en the most con­ser­v­a­tive ten­den­cy with­in Chav­is­mo.14

Reflect­ed in these nation­al dif­fer­ences is the greater or less­er influ­ence of a reac­ti­va­tion of a social, and/or polit­i­cal, oppo­si­tion of the Left. In effect, it is impor­tant to note how in the major­i­ty of these coun­tries, in addi­tion to the rel­a­tive recov­ery of right wing forces, we have been wit­ness­ing over the last few years a rebound of protest on the part of pop­u­lar actors, orga­ni­za­tions, and move­ments, which high­lights the return of an antag­o­nis­tic and autonomous pro­file of these move­ments as a coun­ter­weight to their ear­li­er sub­or­di­na­tion with­in the pas­sive rev­o­lu­tions. Regret­tably, how­ev­er, due to their new­ness, and the absence of orga­ni­za­tion­al con­sis­ten­cy and polit­i­cal artic­u­la­tion, there does not appear to be a sce­nario in which Latin Amer­i­can pol­i­tics could shift to the Left in the imme­di­ate hori­zon. Indeed, in spite of a slow recov­ery of auton­o­my and capac­i­ty for strug­gle, we have not seen wide­spread and impor­tant process­es of the polit­i­cal accu­mu­la­tion of forces over the last few years, since the loss of hege­mo­ny of pro­gres­sivism, except pos­si­bly in the case of the Frente de Izquier­da y de los Tra­ba­jadores (Work­ers’ Left Front, FIT) in Argenti­na, whose per­spec­tives and poten­tial expan­sion are also not guar­an­teed.15 The explo­sion of protests in Ecuador over the last sev­er­al months have put for­ward sev­er­al demands of dis­tinct sec­tors, but in spite of the accu­mu­lat­ed dis­con­tent of pop­u­lar sec­tors, and in par­tic­u­lar of indige­nous move­ments and orga­nized work­ers, this does not guar­an­tee the strength­en­ing of an alter­na­tive polit­i­cal pole of attrac­tion.16

This dif­fi­cul­ty is par­tial­ly due to the ebb that fol­lowed the ascen­dant wave of anti-neolib­er­al strug­gles, as pop­u­lar sec­tors adapt­ed to a polit­i­cal cul­ture of clien­telism; on the oth­er hand, and more impor­tant­ly, this ebb was a prod­uct of the ini­tia­tives, or lack of ini­tia­tives, of pro­gres­sive gov­ern­ments that were more inter­est­ed in build­ing elec­toral sup­port, and to guar­an­tee gov­ern­abil­i­ty with­out social con­flicts, than in push­ing for­ward, or sim­ply respect­ing, the antag­o­nis­tic and autonomous dynam­ics of pop­u­lar orga­ni­za­tion, and the con­struc­tion of chan­nels and forms of par­tic­i­pa­tion and self-deter­mi­na­tion. These would have been nec­es­sary in order to deeply trans­form the life con­di­tions, and not only the capac­i­ty of con­sump­tion, of the sub­al­tern class­es.

This weak­ness, or absence of empow­er­ment, sug­gests that the paci­fy­ing inten­tion which oper­at­ed as a coun­ter­part to the struc­tur­al trans­for­ma­tions and redis­trib­u­tive poli­cies (with­out con­sid­er­ing here the prob­lem­at­ic extrac­tivist and pri­ma­ry-export con­ti­nu­ity in the economies) pro­voked a decade of loss in terms of the accu­mu­la­tion of polit­i­cal force from below, seen from the van­tage point of the autonomous capac­i­ty of pop­u­lar sec­tors, in con­tradis­tinc­tion to their ascen­dan­cy that marked the nineties and that broke neolib­er­al hege­mo­ny, open­ing up the cur­rent his­tor­i­cal sce­nario.

This neg­a­tive bal­ance is what impedes, for the moment, the abil­i­ty to deal with the dou­ble move­ment to the Right – that is, the rel­a­tive strength­en­ing of the polit­i­cal Right and the inter­nal con­ser­v­a­tive and regres­sive turn which has mod­i­fied the equi­lib­ri­ums and polit­i­cal ori­en­ta­tions of the pow­er blocs which sus­tain the pro­gres­sive Latin Amer­i­can gov­ern­ments.

At the same time, the end of pro­gres­sive hege­mo­ny does not appear to imply an imme­di­ate risk of the restora­tion of the Latin Amer­i­can Right, as some­times is pre­dict­ed as a means of black­mail­ing the Left. The var­i­ous Rights are just begin­ning to recu­per­ate from their major loss­es in the 2000s, and as an indi­ca­tion of the impact of pro­gres­sive hege­mo­ny, they are incor­po­rat­ing ideas and prin­ci­ples that do not cor­re­spond to the neolib­er­al ide­al.17 This is a demon­stra­tion of the fact that the cycle of anti-neolib­er­al strug­gles of the nineties and the gov­ern­ments that declared them­selves post-neolib­er­al, have dis­placed cer­tain pil­lars of com­mon sense and have indeed pro­voked a rel­a­tive change of epoch in terms of the polit­i­cal and cul­tur­al agen­da and debate.

In con­clu­sion, in these con­vul­sive times, the course of the Latin Amer­i­can pas­sive rev­o­lu­tions con­tin­ue, sur­round­ed by a grow­ing oppo­si­tion on the Right and Left, and char­ac­ter­ized inter­nal­ly by their own con­ser­v­a­tive and regres­sive turn; they are slid­ing dan­ger­ous­ly down a slope in which they are los­ing their hege­mon­ic lus­ter, demon­strat­ing the pos­si­ble begin­ning to an extend­ed end of the cycle, a process of end­ing with vari­able and inde­ter­mi­nate dura­tion.

– Trans­lat­ed by Jef­fery R. Web­ber

  1. I do not include Hon­duras and Paraguay, which, under the gov­ern­ments of Zelaya and Lugo, for a short peri­od before the so-called “white coups,” were part of the “cycle,” nor Peru, because the gov­ern­ment of Ollan­ta Humala did not exhib­it a suf­fi­cient­ly clear or sus­tained pro­gres­sive moment. I also do not include Chile because of the neolib­er­al pro­file of the gov­ern­ments of the pre­vi­ous Con­certación and, more recent­ly, of the New Major­i­ty led by Bachelet. Apart from their char­ac­ter­i­za­tion, these gov­ern­ments are chrono­log­i­cal­ly out of step with the proces­su­al tem­po­ral­i­ty and resur­gence of the con­junc­tur­al cycle. For a mea­sured assess­ment see Franck Gau­dichaud, “¿Fin de ciclo en Améri­ca del Sur? Los movimien­tos pop­u­lares, la cri­sis de los ‘pro­gre­sis­mos’ guber­na­men­tales y las alter­na­ti­vas ecoso­cial­is­tas,” in Améri­ca Lati­na. Eman­ci­pa­ciones en con­struc­ción (San­ti­a­go: Tiem­po Roba­do Editoras/América en movimien­to, 2015). It is impor­tant to high­light that the notion of “the end of the cycle” is exac­er­bat­ing an already polar­ized debate. Some organ­ic intel­lec­tu­als of Latin Amer­i­can pro­gres­sivism react­ed by uncon­di­tion­al­ly defend­ing the achieve­ments of the gov­ern­ments and vehe­ment­ly denounc­ing the hypoth­e­sis for being, accord­ing to them, the work of a mar­gin­al ultra-Left. For exam­ple, Emir Sad­er,” ¿El final de un cicle (que no exis­tió)?” Pági­na 12, Buenos Aires, Sep­tem­ber 17, 2015. This posi­tion, which sim­pli­fies and polar­izes the crit­i­cisms as ultra-Left­ist is also advanced by the Boli­vian Vice Pres­i­dent Álvaro Gar­cía Lin­era, com­bin­ing it with the envi­ron­men­tal ques­tion, begin­ning with the TIPNIS con­flict in Bolivia that began in 2010 and extend­ing it to the recent peri­od by accus­ing NGOs of being “Green Trot­sky­ists,” act­ing in col­lu­sion with for­eign inter­ests. 

  2. Mas­si­mo Mod­one­si, “Rev­olu­ciones pasi­vas en Améri­ca Lati­na. Una aprox­i­mación gram­s­ciana a la car­ac­ter­i­zación de los gob­ier­nos pro­gre­sis­tas de ini­cio de siglo,” in Hor­i­zontes Gram­s­cianos. Estu­dios en torno al pen­samien­to de Anto­nio Gram­sci (Mex­i­co: FCPyS-UNAM, 2013). 

  3. See Mas­si­mo Mod­one­si, “Rev­olu­ciones pasi­vas en Améri­ca Lati­na. Una aprox­i­mación gram­s­ciana a la car­ac­ter­i­zación de los gob­ier­nos pro­gre­sis­tas de ini­cio de siglo” in El Esta­do en Améri­ca Lati­na: con­tinuidades y rup­turas, ed. Mabel Thwait­es Rey (San­ti­a­go de Chile: CLACSO-ARCIS, 2012). 

  4. The Vice Pres­i­dent of Bolivia, Álvaro Gar­cía Lin­era, spoke of the “point of bifur­ca­tion” in order to cap­ture this strate­gic phase in the cor­re­la­tion of forces which opened up the pos­si­bil­i­ty for hege­mon­ic rule. See Álvaro Gar­cía Lin­era, “Empate cat­a­stró­fi­co y pun­to de bifur­cación,” Críti­ca y eman­ci­pación, núm. 1, CLACSO, Buenos Aires, June 2008. The notion of a change of epoch emerged from an expres­sion of the Ecuado­ri­an Pres­i­dent Rafael Cor­rea who in 2007 argued that what was hap­pen­ing was not “an epoch of changes, but rather a change of epoch.” This idea was tak­en up in the title of ALAS Con­gress in Guadala­jara that year, where I pre­sent­ed a text accept­ing and devel­op­ing the theme. It was lat­er pub­lished as Mas­si­mo Mod­one­si, “Cri­sis hegemóni­ca y movimien­tos antag­o­nistas en Améri­ca Lati­na. Una lec­tura gram­s­ciana del cam­bio de época,” A Con­tra­cor­ri­ente 5, no. 2, 2008. Simul­ta­ne­ous­ly, Maris­tel­la Svam­pa – with whom I devel­oped a fruit­ful dia­logue at this con­fer­ence – pub­lished a book whose title con­tributed to the wider dif­fu­sion of this notion with­in the sphere of aca­d­e­m­ic debate. Maris­tel­la Svam­pa, Cam­bio de época. Movimien­tos sociales y poder politi­co (Buenos Aires: CLAS­CO-Siglo XXI, 2008). 

  5. As sug­gest­ed in Mas­si­mo Mod­one­si, “Con­flic­tivi­dad socio-políti­ca e ini­cio del fin de la hege­monía pro­gre­sista en Améri­ca Lati­na,” in Anuario del con­flic­to social 2013, eds. Jaime Pas­tor and Nicolás Rojas Pede­monte (Barcelona: Uni­ver­si­dad Autóno­ma de Barcelona, 2014). 

  6. See Mas­si­mo Mod­one­si, “Pasivi­dad y sub­al­ternidad. Sobre el con­cep­to de rev­olu­ción pasi­va de Anto­nio Gram­sci,” in Gram­s­ciana. Riv­ista Inter­nazionale de Stu­di su Anto­nio Gram­sci, no.1, Turin, 2015. 

  7. Maris­tel­la Svam­pa, “Améri­ca Lati­na: de nuevas izquier­das a pop­ulis­mos de alta inten­si­dad,” Memo­ria, no. 256, Novem­ber 2015. 

  8. Mabel Thwait­es, “Argenti­na fin de ciclo,” in Memo­ria, no. 254, May 2015. 

  9. Mas­si­mo Mod­one­si, Entre­vista a Fran­cis­co De Oliveira, “Brasil: una hege­monía al revés,” OSAL, no. 30, Novem­ber 2011. 

  10. Fran­cis­co Muñoz Jaramil­lo, ed., Bal­ance críti­co del cor­reís­mo, Quito: Uni­ver­si­dad Cen­tral del Ecuador, 2014. 

  11. Raúl Zibechi has point­ed out very con­crete and tan­gi­ble expres­sions of this in recent mobi­liza­tions against the free trade and ser­vices agree­ment, TISA. Raúl Zibechi, “Diez días que sacud­ieron a Uruguay,” La Jor­na­da, Sep­tem­ber 18, 2015. 

  12. Maris­tel­la Svam­pa, “Ter­mi­na la era de las prome­sas and­i­nas,” Revista Ñ, Clarín, August 25, 2015. 

  13. Pablo Ste­fanoni, “¿Perdió Evo Morales?” Revista Panamá, April 9, 2015. 

  14. Edgar­do Lan­der, “Venezuela: ¿cri­sis ter­mi­nal del mod­e­lo petrolero ren­tista?”, Octo­ber 30, 2014. 

  15. Pablo Ste­fanoni, “El voto trot­sko expli­ca­do a un fin­landés,” Revista Panamá, July 24, 2015. 

  16. Mas­si­mo Mod­one­si, “Entre­vista a Alber­to Acos­ta, ¿Fin de ciclo de los gob­ier­nos pro­gre­sis­tas en Améri­ca Lati­na? Límites y cri­sis del cor­reís­mo en Ecuador” Memo­ria, no. 256, Novem­ber, 2015; Jef­fery R. Web­ber, “Ecuador: en el impasse políti­coVien­to Sur, Sep­tem­ber 20, 2015. 

  17. See the sym­po­sium in the jour­nal Nue­va Sociedad, no. 254, on “Los ros­tros de la derecha en Améri­ca Lati­na,” Novem­ber-Decem­ber, 2014, and in par­tic­u­lar the arti­cles by Fer­nan­do Moli­na on Bolivia and Franklin Ramírez and Vale­ria Coro­nel on Ecuador. 

Author of the article

is a professor in the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences at the Autonomous National University of Mexico (UNAM). He is the author of nine books about social movements and politics in Mexico and Latin America, and concepts of Marxist political theory. See